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Theology Update
On Taboos: The Danish Cartoon
Crisis 2005–20081
By Niels Henrik Gregersen
Abstract: The international crisis following the publication of 12 Muhammad cartoons in the Danish
newspaper Jyllands-Posten (September 30, 2005) raises the general question of how to exercise the freedom
of expression in relation to religious taboos. After briefly reviewing the Cartoon Crisis from September
2005 to the bombings on the Danish Ambassay in Pakistan in June 2008, the article addresses Lutheran
resources for coping with secularisation and desecularisation, in particular as regards the taboos that
persist as a part of religious and humanistic values. The thesis is that the Lutheran doctrine of the
two kingdoms has given rise to two models of interpretation that have both been historically active.
The doctrine of the two regiments has been interpreted both as a ‘liberalist’ argument for a principled
separation of religion and politics, and as a ‘social-conservative’ (later Social Democratic) argument for
the view that the state should take care of its citizens’ welfare through education, the legal system and
social services. In today’s global and multi-religious world, this leads us to ask the question to what
extent a welfare society, for the sake of peace and social order, should, or should not, protect religious
sensitivities. Should religious communities always be kept out of public life, or can they be recognised
as non-governmental organizations in civil society, hence as potential partners for the state?
Key Terms: Cartoon Crisis, Denmark, doctrine of two kingdoms, freedom of expression, images, Luther,
Muhammad, secularization and desecularization, taboos
Introduction
During 2005 and 2006 Denmark experienced its
greatest crisis in foreign politics since the Nazi oc-
cupation of Denmark between 1940 and 1945.
This crisis was prompted by the publication of
twelve seemingly innocent cartoons of the Islamic
prophet Muhammad in a Danish Newspaper.
Put in ideological terms, the controversy was
about how to negotiate the freedom of expression
in a Western society versus the rights of religious
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Semantics, a newly established Center of Excellence at Copenhagen University. He is Editor in Chief of Dansk Teologisk Tidsskrift and a member
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communities to exist without being the particu-
lar target of scorn. Hence, even the naming of
the crisis turned out to be controversial. Was it a
“Muhammad-crisis” (as seen from the secular van-
tage point), or was a “cartoon-crisis” (as seen from
the point of view of many Muslims)? Seen in a
sociological perspective, the controversy was about
the relation between secular society and strongly
desecularizing forces of society, such as some Is-
lamic communities in the West. Political analyses
of the controversy have naturally focused on the
way in which domestic politics, be it in Denmark
C© 2009 Wiley Periodicals and Dialog, Inc.
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or in Middle East countries, often inadvertently
escalate conflicts at the level of international pol-
itics. Danish politicians have no doubt acted ac-
cording to perceived notions of what it means to
live under a free constitution, and what it means
to live the Danish way. Likewise, Muslim politi-
cians have reacted to the crisis in terms of social
imaginations of being a genuine Muslim commu-
nity under attack from a secular and anti-Muslim
society.
Taboos and “Two Kingdoms”
The question to be pursued in this article is how
secular societies can deal with the persistence of
religious feelings related to taboos. As I argue,
taboos are species-wide, and also exist in secular
circles. Children, for example, are sexually taboo;
and humanists as well as normally sensitive peo-
ple react strongly against attempts to make fun out
of the pains of fellow human beings. This taboo
may explain the absolute disgust in most parts
of the world upon hearing the President of Iran,
Mahmoud Ahmadinejah announce a contest for
Holocaust cartoons in reaction to the Danish
Muhammad cartoons.
More specifically, however, I explore ways in
which ways the Lutheran doctrine of the two king-
doms can be applied to a multi-religious society. I
argue that the ‘liberalist’ interpretation of Luther’s
doctrine, demanding a clean separation between re-
ligion and politics, is not only historically wrong,
but also incapable of coping with religious crises
coming up on the interface between the public
and the private realms of religious life. I also in-
tend to show that the doctrine of the two kingdoms
originally was part of a cultural program for soci-
ety, which can best be termed a ‘social-conservative’
program. This program has been a seminal inspi-
ration for the development of the comprehensive
welfare state in modern continental Europe. It is
argued that the doctrine of the two kingdoms may
possess untapped resources for recognizing non-
Christian communities not only in the public realm
of society, but also at political and legal level.
The Muhammad Cartoon Crisis
in Outline
Let me begin by reminding readers of the sequence
of events. On September 30, 2005, the major
Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten publicized 12
cartoons of Muhammad, some generally sympa-
thetic, some more satirical, including one depict-
ing an angry man with a bomb in his turban.2
One day earlier, September 29, the newspaper’s
cultural editor, Flemming Rose, explained why
Jyllands-Posten had decided to publish the draw-
ings on the following day: “Modern secular soci-
ety is rejected by some Muslims. They require a
special status when insisting on special treatments
in relation to their own religious feelings. This is
incompatible with a secular democracy with free-
dom of expression, where one must be ready to
endure scorn, mockery, and ridicule.”3 The imme-
diate background of this intervention was a heated
discussion in Denmark (and elsewhere in Europe)
about the role of the growing Islamic extremism in
Europe. Also, the leftist Danish newspaper, Poli-
tiken, had already on September 17, 2005 issued
an article titled, “Deep Fears for Criticizing Is-
lam.” The article reported that a Danish writer,
Ka˚re Bluitgen, had difficulties finding anyone will-
ing to illustrate his book on the life of Muhammad.
“One said ‘No’ while referring to the murder in
Amsterdam of the instructor Theo van Gogh,
another said ‘No’ with reference to the episode
against a teacher at the Carsten Niebuhr In-
stitute.” It also reported that a university
teacher from the respected Niebuhr Institute at
Copenhagen University, not a believer himself, had
been caught up by five men and beaten seri-
ously, because he had been reading aloud pas-
sages from the Qur’an in Arabic during his lec-
tures. From the point of view of the editor,
Jyllands-Posten’s agenda was to exercise the courage
of the press to defend the tradition of being
free to criticize living religions, Islam as well as
other religions, even to the point of mockery and
ridicule.
On Taboos: The Danish Cartoon Crisis 2005–2008 • Niels Henrik Gregersen 81
Freedom of Expression vs. Freedom
of Religion
This was not how the situation was seen from the
outside, however. Jyllands-Posten has a readership
in the center and right end of the political spec-
trum, some of whom are highly critical of Mus-
lim groups in Denmark. It was therefore hardly
a surpise that many Muslims felt themselves par-
ticularly targeted by the newspaper. The reactions
turned out to be indeed strong. Soon after the
publication of the cartoons, on October 4, 2005, a
threat was issued anonymously (eventually revealed
to be a 17 year old boy) against the cartoonists; this
was immediately reported in prime time news. On
October 8, the so-called Islamic Faith Community (a
Copenhagen-based congregation of partly radical-
ized Muslims) issued a press release, calling upon
Jyllands-Posten to “withdraw unreservedly the car-
toons and give an apology to Muslims for its
arrogant and respectless action.” The editor in
chief responded that he could “not dream of”
withdrawing or apologizing. On October 14, a
major peaceful demonstration by Muslims took
place against the newspaper. At the same time,
two of the cartoonists were adviced to go under-
ground by the Secret Service, based on threats of
death.
By October 2005 the case had escalated from a
national debate to the international political scene.
October 12, al-Jazeera reported on the cartoons and
refered to the statement of the Islamic Faith Com-
munity, and the same day 11 ambassadors to Mus-
lims countries requested a meeting with the Danish
Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, in order
to discuss “actions to be taken” against Jyllands-
Posten, including a demand to “proceed legally”
against the newspaper “in order to secure religious
harmony, better integration and improve the rela-
tions of Denmark to the Muslim world.” Fogh Ras-
mussen, however, refused to meet with the ambas-
sadors citing the freedom of expression in Danish
and other free societies. As a matter of principle,
politicians cannot and should not interfere with the
editorial choices of the free press, argued the Prime
Minister from the Liberal Party.
The former leader of the Liberal Party and
also a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Uffe
Ellemann-Jensen supported the view of the Prime
Minister in principle. On October 26, 2005,
however, he strongly criticized Jyllands-Posten for
its “immature demonstration of freedom,” thereby
indirectly critizicing the silence of the Prime
Minister. As international critiques continued, on
December 20 a group of 22 former Danish am-
bassadors took the highly unusual step of making
full-page advertisements in the major newspapers,
advising the officials in Denmark to take steps for
a serious dialogue with Muslim representatives. The
tense public debate in Denmark “can only be seen
as a persecution of the minority constituted by
Muslims co-citizens,” they wrote, and continued:
“Both the freedom of religion and freedom of
expression are Constitutional rights, but it has
never been compatible with Danish attitudes to
use the freedom in order deliberately to hurt a
minority.”4
Criticisms Mount, Tempers Flare
The former ambassadors’ advertisement was in re-
sponse to the global reaction on the cartoons. On
December 2, a reward of 10,000 dollars was offered
by the Pakistan organization Jamaat-e-Islami on the
head of the cartoonists, a reward widely publi-
cized, reportedly also during a demonstration in
Denmark against Jyllands-Posten. On December 7,
a summit of the Organization of Islamic Countries
put the cartoons on their agenda, and the same
day the UN High-Commisioner for Human Rights,
Louise Aarbour, issued a statement that “regrets any
declaration or action that can show a failure of re-
spect for the religion of others.” On December 27,
the cooperation of Muslim collaboration, ISESCO,
warned against a forthcoming boycott of Danish
trade, followed up on December 29 by a strong
critique of the Danish government for its han-
dling of the affair by the foreign ministers of the
Arab Liga. Other UN-oficials as well as EU-officials
criticized the handling of the affair by Danish
authorities.
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By January 2, 2006, it was revealed that a group
of well-known Danish imams, led by Abu Laban
from the aforementioned Islamic Faith Community,
had been travelling around in the Middle East in-
citing reactions against Denmark. They had dis-
tributed a picture of man with a pig-nose as if it
were one of the Mohammed-cartoons (eventually
the picture was proved to have been taken from a
Pig Festival in Southern France that had nothing
to do with Muhammad). On January 8, the imams
claimed that there is “no written evidence” that
they had actually spread misinformation about
Denmark in Egypt. Be this as it may, during
January 2006 the boycott against Denmark by a
long list of Muslim countries went into effect.
During the last days of January and the first
of February, Danish (and incidentally Norwegian)
flags were burned in demonstrations in Gaza and
elsewhere.
In response, the French newspaper France Soir
and the important German newspaper Die Welt re-
issued part of the cartoons on February 1, 2006.
The conflict could now be interpreted as a more
general conflict between the Muslim countries and
the West. Politically orchestrated demonstrations
were made both in Syria, leading to the burning
of the Norwegian-Danish embassy on February 4
(whereby one demonstrant died); followed by the
burning of the Danish consulate in Lebanon on
February 5, and attacks on the Teheran embassy
on February 6. In Afghanistan 11 people were
killed during demonstrations February 8; in Pak-
istan 5 people were tramped down on a demonstra-
tion February 14–15; and 17 were killed in Libya
on February 17, when the Italian consulate was
set on fire. On February 15, 15 were killed dur-
ing demonstrations in Nigeria, and 11 Christian
churches were burnt down. Since then, Denmark
has been in the unusual position of being targeted
as a particularly anti-Muslim nation. However, dur-
ing the remainder of 2006 and 2007 many diplo-
matic initiatives succeeded to put an end to the
crisis. Overall, the situation seemed to have calmed
down. While Danish products continued to have
problems being sold in some Muslim countries, the
Danish brand of courage helped exports in other
parts of the world.
Throwing Stones?
On February 12, 2008, however, a new develop-
ment occurred. The Danish police arrested three
persons for planning the murder of Kurt Wester-
gaard, the cartoonist of the man with a bomb in
his turban. As a reaction, 17 major newspapers in
Denmark republished the cartoons. This led to new
demonstrations, and new boycotts. The minister of
foreign affairs, Per Stig Møller (himself a mem-
ber the Conservative party) now said what the lib-
eral Prime Minister would not say: “It is our right
to condemn these drawings. Freedom of expression
does not mean throwing stones through the neigh-
bor’s window. It is only the fundamentalists in both
camps that benefit from that sort of action, and this
is the real threat against democracy.” Interestingly,
it is now seen by Per Stig Møller as the right, if
not an obligation, of politicians to condemn ed-
itorial choices that disturb public order. Likewise,
the so-named fundamentalists were no longer only
the radical Muslims but also the self-declared liberal
secularists. Such a statement was hardly thinkable
before the Cartoon Crisis.
As of this date, however, Denmark and Danes
are no longer popular in many Muslim countries.
The attack on the Danish embassy in Pakistan on
June 2, 2008, which resulted in 14 new casuali-
ties, exemplifies the situation, as well as the fact
that during the Olympic Games in Beijing, August
2008, Danish citizens were rated to be as much a
target of terrorist attacks as the participants from
Israel and the US. In the views of many, the white
swan of H.C. Andersen has once again turned into
an ugly duckling.
What to think of the mess?
In what follows, I move from sociological consid-
erations of the presence of religion in public life
to a broader theological analysis. It seems that the
Cartoon Crisis gives rise to a more general ques-
tion: is the proper place of religion in the pri-
vate sphere only, while in the public sphere, the
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interests of religious groups can be either neglected
or rejected cost-free? Or must a modern complex
society recognise the presence of various kinds of
religious communities and subcultures, each with
their vulnerabilities, which society is bound to pro-
tect to a reasonable degree without compromising
fundamental freedom rights, including the freedom
to criticise the claims to validity and socio-ethical
consequences of any religion?
It is the latter position of mutual recognition
that I wish to promote—in three steps. First, I
shall present general historical arguments show-
ing that religion–like education, for example–cuts
across both the private and the public sphere. Since
religions are practised in social fellowships, they
cannot help but have an effect on society as a
whole; they are not merely sets of beliefs (in the
head), they are also practised by embodied agents
in the world at large. And since they also take
public form in linguistic and symbolic expressions,
religions are always part of public life. Hence any
society will have to respond to the pre-political
fact of religion, be it through legislation, through
teaching in schools, or through political rhetoric.
The question is, how?
Second, I shall examine how Lutheranism has
had a twofold effect. Through his doctrine of the
two kingdoms, Luther laid the groundwork for the
distinction between the religious and the politi-
cal spheres. Lutheranism is often appealed to by
proponents of the liberalist idea of society. “Keep
Religion Indoors,” wrote Prime Minister Anders
Fogh Rasmussen in a long essay in the newspa-
per Politiken (March 20, 2006), while referring to
the teachings of Jesus and the doctrine of the
two kingdoms by Luther.5 Yet at the same time
Lutheranism formed the basis of a comprehensive
welfare state, where the king–later the politicians–
was expected to take care of the citizens’ well-being
through the legal, educational, health and social
systems. In other words, at one and the same
time Lutheranism formed the basis for the liber-
alist distinction between private and public, and
for the modern welfare state. The Scandinavian-
style comprehensive welfare state, where resources
are shared among all citizens, was set in motion
in Denmark by a Conservative government with a
pension reform of 1891, but was first realised by
Social Democrat governments in the course of the
20th century, most markedly in the Old People’s
Pensions Act of 1955 (without support from the
right-wing parties).
With this in mind I shall conclude some
thoughts on the international crisis for Denmark’s
reputation and economy provoked by the publica-
tion of the Muhammad cartoons in 2005.
Secularisation(s)
The term ‘secularisation’ can mean many things. As
a purely politico-economic concept it means that
the property and numerous tasks of the church
are gradually taken over by the state. In this sense
the beginning of the Reformation in Denmark in
1536 led to an immediate and thorough-going sec-
ularisation of Danish society. The king simply took
over large areas of church land (which made up
roughly one-third of the country), while the state
assumed control of all obligations of the public le-
gal system, the education system and social care
(including the functions that previously belonged
under canon law: church schools, education, and
monastic poor relief ).
But more commonly, secularisation is used to
refer to the lengthy historical process during which
religion gradually weakens its hold on the public
life of society. I shall settle here for briefly present-
ing two theories of secularisation which attempt to
explain this development from a macro-sociological
perspective.
The Rationalist Theory of Secularisation
The classical ‘secularisation thesis’ was formulated
by the sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920) and
the historian of ideas Karl Lo¨with (1897–1973).
Its premise is that Christianity (especially Protes-
tantism) initiated a process of rationalisation by
which it will eventually and reluctantly dig its own
grave. The process began with an apologetic ‘natu-
ral theology’ in the seventeenth century, and ended
up, in the mid-nineteenth century, with Ludwig
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Feuerbach’s and Karl Marx’s effective critiques of re-
ligion, which aimed to show that all images of God
are ultimately human projections based on human-
ity’s insatiable demand for meaning and comfort.
According to Weber’s thesis of ‘Occidental Ratio-
nalisation,’ the ‘value-based rationality’ with which
Christianity’s moral universe encircled life has been
replaced by ‘goal-oriented’ rationality’—as we find
it for example in political bureaucracy and ethical
utilitarianism. ‘The good’ is what leads to good
consequences without anything beforehand being
deemed either good or bad ‘in itself.’
In principle it is Weber’s secularisation theory
that is the inheritance of the young Peter L. Berger6
and the work of Ju¨rgen Habermas.7 On the basis
of the above theory, many sociologists in the 1960s
and 1970s prophesied the decline of religion, which
was seen as a left-over from pre-modern times, and
condemned it to an inevitable death. But the theory
has been difficult to maintain. In the first place a
number of religions have shown the ability to make
their case in a rationally understandable form; and
secondly, religious life has returned to the agenda
even in highly-developed countries like the USA
and South Korea.8
Already around 1970 Berger was aware of the
simultaneity of secularisation and de-secularisation,
while it is only in recent years that Habermas ac-
knowledged that religion not only plays a role as
an interpreter of the contingencies of life situations
(death, guilt, happiness), but also as a source of
ethical visions guiding common life. The reason is
not least that religion continues to be a cultural
resource that forms part of society’s preferences,
which are never entirely rational. Why, for exam-
ple, spend money on establishing hospices, when
society gets nothing out of them, and why not use
the heat from crematoria ovens for district heating?
Recently Habermas published an essay on “Reli-
gion in the Public Sphere,” in which he reluctantly
acknowledged that “the significance of religion for
the political objective is now increasing through-
out the world . . . In a world-historical perspective
Max Weber’s ‘Occidental Rationalism’ now appears
to be a specific historical exception.”9 And even
though Habermas continues to insist that secular
reasons should be given priority in the political
system, he now admits that liberal democracy nei-
ther can nor should “prevent religious citizens from
publicly expressing and justifying their convictions
in a religious language.” He continues: “The lib-
eral state actually has a self-interest in letting the
religious voices sound in the political public sphere
and in the political participation of religious organ-
isations . . . The society cannot know whether the
secular society would otherwise be cut off from
important resources for the formation of opinion
and identity.”10 Acording to this view, there is nei-
ther rational reason nor political prudence in an
over-hasty reduction of the multi-voiced complexity.
Habermas is now prepared to admit that religious
traditions may articulate moral intuitions of general
importance for the common good, and that reli-
gions may also present “cognitive challenges” worth
being taken seriously by the secular public. In short,
Habermas calls for the emergence of a new political
culture in which mutual learning processes can take
place between religious and secular views of reality
and society.
Habermas is thus today aware of the difficulties
of the rationalisation thesis—as a contemporary di-
agnosis, as a moral position, and as a potentially
one-sided cognitive strategy. Religious people—be
they Christian, Muslim or Buddhist—are not nec-
essarily less intelligent than everyone else. On the
contrary the various religions may contain a reser-
voir of life-orienting wisdom that cannot easily be
tapped into from anywhere else.
Secularisation as a Consequence
of the Centreless Society
A different general theory of secularisation, which
in my view is better equipped to explain why re-
ligion is simultaneously retreating from the centre
of society and yet returning with renewed vigour,
is the so-called theory of differentiation. The late
German system theorist Niklas Luhmann has ar-
gued that a modern hyper-complex society is a cen-
treless society, where the central control of political
and religious life of previous ages is no longer possi-
ble. We are moving away from a uniform dogmatic
religion towards a religious pluralism, in which
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different religious groups coexist with varying
world-pictures. At the same time, sporadic res-
onances of the language- and life-forms of reli-
gion are arising in many and various media, from
daily and weekly newspapers to literature and art.
According to this thesis religion has the almost
Sisyphean task of creating coherence in a world
that is split up into various systems: the political,
the legal, the educational, the religious, the moral,
the scientific, the artistic and so on.11
The thesis of the centreless society is that all of
society’s constituent systems lack the ability to de-
fine society’s centre. The political system also has
proved incapable of controlling the economic sys-
tem from above, just as both moral opinions and
religious commitments have shown themselves to
be relatively uncontrollable by the political system.
The political agenda is thus set, to a high degree,
by the media’s agenda, which articulates fluid moral
and religious ideas that cannot be controlled by
political power. That was the case with the youth
rebellion of the 1960s, and that has been the case
ever since. The way that the Danish company Arla
Foods managed the Cartoon Crisis in 2005 and
ever since shows that even the economic system
must adapt to value politics and to religious policy-
making. Today large firms are participating in sym-
bol politics to a degree that no one could have
imagined 20 years ago. For example, the board of
Arla Foods is consciously working towards including
religio-ethnic groups into their management.
If we are to understand secularisation as a re-
treat of religion from the centre of society, then
we must immediately add to the list of retreating
spheres even powerful systems such as politics and
the economy. Though religion no longer finds itself
at the centre of society, there is no reason to sup-
pose that it will disappear from the public sphere.
On the other hand, the major religious denomina-
tions, such as the Lutheran Church in Denmark,
are expected to decline in relation to the total pop-
ulation (even though it lost only 3,000 members
out of 41/2 million in 2005). At the same time it
is likely that many smaller religious communities
will come into being, while “faith in God is thinly
smeared over everywhere,” as the Norwegian soci-
ologist of religion Ingvild Sælid Gilhus puts it.12
Religion is thus changing, but not actually de-
clining. According to Luhmann, religion will sur-
vive for the simple reason that it deals with ques-
tions that can only be given a religious answer:
What is the ultimate horizon for human life (which
we cannot observe)? What is the purpose of life
(which we cannot see)? And what is my or our spe-
cific task in life (which we must decide on based
on pre-rational grounds)? Luhmann believes that
religion is therefore necessary because it relates to
recurring and emerging problems (Dauerprobleme),
but its position tends to be weak because its forms
of communication are by nature relatively vague.
It is hard to speak with certainty of one’s place in
life, what we should spend our resources on, the
purpose of suffering or its absurdity, how the in-
dividual’s life fits into universal principles such as
creation and salvation, samsara and nirvana, and so
on.
The difficulty that religion faces is that faith
or ‘spiritual communication’ has no medium that
flows as well and effectively as money does in the
economic system, or power in the political system.
Religion therefore remains a rather uneasy system
in the modern world. On the one hand, it is a
limited player in the social system, yet on the other
its universal themes stretch beyond the individual
group and its members: life and death, joy and
suffering, existence and annihilation.
Thus it is natural that religion is found in
both solid and fluid forms–highly institutionalised
or loosely flexible in its forms of communication–
since religious semantics (meanings and priorities)
float around in society more or less independently
of the religious commitment of the individuals. Re-
ligion functions as an underlying resource that ori-
ents the individual towards personal existence and
social value.
The Twofold Presence of
Religion in the Public Sphere
To understand the return of religion to the public
sphere it is worth remembering that it is not only
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something one has (or does not have), but also
something one does (or does not do). Religion is
not merely about religious feelings, which emerge
now and again and then evaporate, or about be-
liefs that one holds or gives up. Above all religion
has to do with the orientation of life. This is also
true of Christianity. Whether we look at the young
Christianity of the early church or Christianity at
the Reformation, three practical elements endure.
They are:
• Issues of food and drink (what we take into the
body)
• Issues of bodiliness, clothing and sexuality (use
of the body and clothing as signals)
• The issue of images and other items in a phys-
ical space (that influence our imagination and
fantasy)
It is not by chance that food and drink, body
and clothing, and images have occupied the mind.
Yet it is precisely Christianity that has helped to
secularise their meaning—largely in the course of
the 20th century, with perhaps sexuality as the only
exception. The privileging of the individual, which
can be traced throughout the history of Western
Christianity, was extended during 19th century Ro-
manticism to include the idea of the privileged
beloved. Love must be of one’s own free will, and
yet it commits one to another. Despite attempts in
the 1970s with free sexuality and open marriages,
sexual life today is regarded predominantly as a
privilege, at least after one has contracted oneself
to a committed relationship.
Not only in Islam, but also in secularised Protes-
tant forms of Christianity there are taboos, which
are first discovered when they are violated. Dan-
ish legislation includes the taboo against killing
(which goes back to the Jewish understanding of
humanity being created in God’s image, Gen 9:6,
and whose historical context includes the killing
of slaves). But Denmark also has a taboo in re-
lation to the dead—see the Danish Penal Code
Art. 139 on “the desecration of graves” and “un-
seemly treatment of corpses,” punishable by up
to 6 months’ imprisonment. There also remains
the moral taboo that one must not make fun of
the suffering and death of others. So jokes about
the Holocaust and torture are morally repugnant.
When a group of Palestinian youths in Odense,
Denmark publicly celebrated the 9/11 attack on
the World Trade Center, they provoked a deep an-
imosity among virtually all native Danes. The holy
zones of taboo are only discovered when they are
violated.
Conflicting Values and Preferences
On the other hand imagery, food and drink, body
and clothing have been desacralised in the Chris-
tian tradition. A predominantly Christian culture
like that of Denmark has therefore found it hard
to relate to Islam, since significant numbers of
the Muslim population observe specific rules for
food and drink, nakedness and clothing, as well
as imagery. Islam defines itself through many of
the same religious practices found in Christian-
ity: devotion to God, prayer, and so on. How-
ever, it is characteristic that the public debate on
Islam so often turns on pork and halal (what is
taken into the body), on arranged marriages and
the veil (what the body is used for), and now the
cartoons of Muhammad (images in front of our
eyes). Because religion is never totally invisible, it
follows that it must appear in the public sphere
too.
Religion is, of course, not just about eating
regulations and so on; it is also present in the
public sphere as a resource for practical decision-
making. It is not just about ‘ideas of God,’ but
also contains a set of values that serve to deter-
mine which preferences we have, and those we
wish to live by. In modern society there are prin-
ciples that all citizens are expected to share, as well
as a whole series of choices. But between the gen-
eral principles and the individual choices we have
a large number of relatively shared, or overlap-
ping, values and preferences that have their source
in the great semantics of our comprehensive world-
views, and that we acquire through our upbring-
ing and social life, for example through family and
school.
When we look at the historical influence of
Christianity in European and North American
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cultures, we find, for example, a strong preference
for the individual. Such an orientation is far from
universal, and is rare in African cultures, and in
South and Eastern Asia. There are further prefer-
ences in relation to family and worklife, which draw
on the resources from a Protestant ethics of voca-
tion and work morale. Then there are preferences
for the welfare state (in Europe, but apparently not
in the US), and its concern for the public good
that stretches beyond one’s own family and eth-
nic groups. And so taxes are accepted by Northern
Europeans to a degree that would be regarded as
unreasonable in other cultures.
Such values or preferences continue to be nego-
tiable of course; religious resources can both erode
and return with renewed strength. It is also clear
that non-religious equivalents exist as regards the
individual, the family, work and the public good,
such as in a post-Christian humanism. But it is
difficult to ignore the fact that religions continue
to be present in the public sphere as underlying
models of orientation for what the good life con-
sists of, and how in practice it can be achieved.
Just as religion exists in both solid and fluid forms,
so does Christianity appear in both church-related
forms of Christianity and in a cultural Christianity,
without the latter being necessarily less ‘Christian’
than the former.13
Christianity’s Contribution
to Secularisation
So far I have spoken relatively abstractly about ‘re-
ligion’ as a phenomenon, as though it were an
object. But ‘religion’ is a designation for a host of
actual religions that branch out into endless vari-
ants. It is now time to be more concrete and look
at the particular historical conditions as to why,
when the majority of Danes in September 2005 did
not regard Jyllands-Posten’s Muhammad cartoons as
especially disgraceful, a great number of Muslims
did. My point in the following is that Christianity
itself has been instrumental in its own secularisa-
tion, inasmuch as eating habits, clothing and im-
agery have been seen as immaterial to keeping the
faith. At the same time, Christianity has formed
a special sensibility towards hypocrisy, which has
a history of being exposed through satire and
humour.
The Jesus Tradition and the Distinction
between the Inner and the Outer
Let me here bring in a perspective from the Jesus-
tradition. Some of Jesus’ sayings have been partic-
ularly influential for the European-Christian men-
tality, especially those that focus on the distinction
between the inner and the outer: “Do you not see
that whatever goes into a person from outside can-
not defile, since it enters, not the heart but the
stomach, and goes out into the sewer?” (Thus he
declared all foods clean.) And he said, “It is what
comes out of a person that defiles.” (Mk 7:18–23)
With this distinction between inner and outer
not only is all food declared clean (though early
Christianity continued to debate the subject, see
Acts 11:1–18), but hypocrites and their double
standards were put in their place, with a further
reference to Isaiah: “This people honors me with
their lips, but their hearts are far from me; in vain
do they worship me, teaching human precepts as
doctrines.” (Mk 7:6–7)
The attack on religious hypocrisy led to a re-
treat from worshipping God so outwardly—praying
in the streets and squares in order to be seen in-
stead of in one’s own heart of hearts (Mt 6: 1–3).
But this also meant that evil could no longer be
explained as always someone else’s fault, with one-
self as the perennial victim. Now evil came from
within, and one should therefore examine oneself
before judging others: “Why do you look at the
speck of sawdust in your neighbor’s eye and pay
no attention to the plank in your own eye?” (Mt
7:3). Such Christian semantics have had major and
lasting effects. We do not have to read many of
the writings of Martin Luther before we run into
sharp satire against the papacy and all the pomp
and circumstance with which its bishops covered
up the fact that it was hiding the gospel from the
people.
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Images and Hypocrisy
Drawing again on this distinction between inner
and outer it is also possible to understand why
the majority of Danes (who hardly wish to mock
Muslims’ religious feelings) had not imagined that
the Muhammad cartoons would be regarded as par-
ticularly disrespectful. For in a Christian culture,
images are normally seen as peripheral to the cen-
tral existential and religious message. There is no
doubt that the effects of the Muhammad cartoons
surprised the majority of Danes, including parlia-
mentary politicians. By way of comparison we can
look at the series of caricatures of Jesus’ crucifixion
published in Universitetsavisen, the official publica-
tion of the University of Copenhagen in the au-
tumn of 2005 (and reprinted in spring 2006) that
barely raised an eyebrow. Admittedly other works,
such as Andres Serrano’s Piss Christ (in which a
crucifix with Jesus was soaked in the artist’s own
urine), have been regarded as disrespectful by cer-
tain Christian groups in the USA. But others have
seen Piss Christ as a work of art calling for a reli-
gious reflection on the depth of divine incarnation
into the very shit of this world.
It is doubtful whether Western Christianity has
the sensibility to understand the offence caused
by images. On the other hand, as we have seen,
Christians have a strong aversion to hypocrisy
and double-speak. When Arab governments, which
themselves allow Judasim and Christianity to be
violated in their own countries, asked the Danish
government to apologise for picture published in a
Danish newspaper over which the government had
no influence, the vast majority of Danes, includ-
ing a number of immigrants (who were themselves
persecuted in Arab countries), experienced this as
patent hypocrisy. And when imam Abu Laban of
the Islamic Faith Community initially told Danish
TV that the Community was against a boycott of
Danish goods but a few days later argued for the
opposite on a major Arab TV channel, this was
taken in Denmark to be godless mendacity.
My point here is that the sense of hypocrisy
is independent of whether individual Danes un-
derstand themselves as Christian believers or not.
There is a religious sensibility that has gone into
the blood of the folk mentality. This is simply just
one example of how a religion functions as a norm-
setter.
The Pauline Tradition and the Christian
Distinction Between Freedom
and Benefit
The criticism of the Jesus-tradition against flam-
boyant worship of God has not led to a general
rejection of outward worship, but instead has made
possible a new attitude to all visible and organ-
ised religion. Christianity was born as a freedom
culture, building on the motto of the apostle Paul
that “‘Everything is permissible for me’ but not
everything is beneficial” (1 Cor 6:12).
Thus Christian freedom should not result in in-
consideration or callousness toward another. Ulti-
mately, what is or is not beneficial always has to
do with the weaker neighbor. Let the one weak in
faith eat vegetables (and not meat from the Ro-
man temples), says Paul, as long as s/he does so in
Christ (Rom 10). Let you heathens have your im-
ages, they are not worth anything anyway, he says
to the Athenians:
Athenians! I see that in every way you are
very religious . . . But the God who made the
world and everything in it is the Lord of
heaven and earth and does not live in tem-
ples built by hands . . . For in him we live
and move and have our being. As some of
your own poets have said, ‘We are his off-
spring.’ Therefore since we are God’s off-
spring, we should not think that the divine
being is like gold or silver or stone – an im-
age made by mortal design and skill. (Acts
17:22–29)
Again we meet the same line of thinking. Paul ob-
viously regards images of God as an expression of
religious misunderstanding. But the tone is con-
ciliatory, since he regards those who worship im-
ages of God as confused. What they need is clear
preaching and religious instruction, not violent
suppression.
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John of Damascus on the Limits
of Image Worship
But images do have an effect. That is why in Chris-
tianity too there was a dispute over images in the
8th and 9th centuries; moreover, this occurred under
the influence of Islamic thought.14 The so-called
iconoclasts referred to the prohibition against im-
ages in the Old Testament, while the iconolaters
(image-worshippers) maintained that although the
eternal God could not himself be depicted, nev-
ertheless one is allowed to make pictures of Jesus
Christ, in whom God has entered in the world of
the flesh and the image. Does not Paul tell the
Colossians that Christ is “the invisible God’s (visi-
ble) image” (Col 1:15)?
The defining theologian was here John of Dam-
ascus (680–749); it was he who formulated the
following theological ground rules that became nor-
mative in both the Eastern and the Western church:
• God’s nature (ous´ıa) cannot be depicted, but
God’s energies (energeiai) and the grace (charis),
through which He approaches humanity’s imag-
ination can.
• Images can therefore not be worshipped; only
God can be worshipped (latreia).
• Images may however serve as paths to God, and
in that sense may be embraced with veneration
(time) and worship (proskynesis)
• Hence the image is only a depiction (ektypos)
of the reality of the divine image (archetypos)
which alone is worthy of worship.
• Since God has become human in Jesus Christ,
depictions of him are allowed, well-knowing that
it is through his human manifestation that his
divine nature is worshipped.
Ultimately it is belief in the incarnation that
makes the use of imagery legitimate for the church:
“In honouring the image of the precious and life-
giving cross, we are honouring not the wood (God
forbid!), but we are honouring the image as a sym-
bol of Christ . . . Everything is therefore directed to-
wards God, whom we worship, in that we transfer
worship from the image to him” (De fide Ortodoxa,
IV, 11).
This solution was elevated to orthodox doctrine
at the Council of Nicea in 787, and despite re-
current disputes on the subject in the 9th century
it remains normative theology. In the words of the
great medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas, images
rank far below humanity in status, for it is hu-
manity who has fabricated the images and not the
other way round. Nonetheless images have a legit-
imate function in the religious life, in that “the
image’s honour is passed on to the prototype, that
is, God himself ” (Summa Theologiae III q. 25 a 3).
Evidently, this is a continuation of John of Dam-
ascus’ argument.
The laying down of these principles did not pre-
vent a steady criticism of the excessively luxurious
imagery throughout the Middle Ages; at the same
time it was defended for its educational value. For
what the scholar can read in the Bible, the illit-
erate layperson must acquire through perception.
This view, which can be traced back to Pope Gre-
gory the Great (c. 540–604), has led to Christian-
ity’s wealth of imagery in medieval icons and fres-
cos, and the richly illustrated Bibles known as Bib-
lia pauporum or Bibles for the poor—not because
they were cheap but because they could be read by
illiterates.
Luther and Calvin on Imagery
Nevertheless the dispute over images dragged on
into the Reformation, at which point iconoclasts
like Andreas Karlstadt and his supporters smashed
images in the churches of Wittenberg in 1520–21,
while Luther was in exile in Wartburg castle. The
desire for white, unpainted churches also became
the norm in the Calvinist churches, which took
the prohibition against imagery in the Ten Com-
mandments quite literally.
By contrast, Luther followed John of Damascus’
theological arguments and Gregory the Great’s ed-
ucational argument. The difference can be seen in
the amount of ink and energy that John Calvin
(1509–1564) expends on his commentary to the
Ten Commandments, telling his readers that be-
cause God is invisible and without form, he can-
not and must not be worshipped through any
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human-made image, not even for educational pur-
poses (Institutio I,11, 1559).
Luther on the other hand chose not to treat
the second commandment on graven images in
the Small Catechism and the Large Catechism from
1529. According to him the Ten Commandments
are of their time, and though still apposite as a
formulation of natural law of conscience, to which
all human beings can subscribe, he points out
in a Lenten sermon in 1521 (immediately after
his return to Wittenberg) that the Old Testament
contains numerous examples of Noah, Abraham
and Jacob building altars to the honour of God
(Gen 8:20; 12:7; 33:20). Even Moses used a cop-
per snake as an image of God’s guidance (Num
21:9). As Luther says in the third Invocavit Ser-
mon in 1522, “Here we must admit that we can
have images and may fabricate images, but we must
not worship them, and if they are worshipped,
they must be removed and destroyed.”15 We do
not serve God through images, but there is no
reason to destroy them, for in reality they are
harmless.
The deeper reason for Luther’s relaxed attitude
to images is that a prohibition will make no differ-
ence anyway. For it is above all the mental pictures
we conjure up of God that can throw us off track
(in the spirit of the law), or build us up (in the
spirit of the gospel). False allegiance to the law
involves us removing the outer images yet filling
ourselves up inside with idols, he says in a later
work against the Anabaptists from 1525.16 Luther’s
position may be summed up in three main points
that fuse together the distinction between the inner
and the outer that we found in the Jesus-tradition,
and the freedom-and-benefit view from the Pauline
tradition:
• “Everything is free” (p. 91); hence the question
of imagery is a secondary matter.
• “One is to trust alone in Christ” (p. 91); accord-
ingly each believer is responsible for destroying
the false images with the Word of God, not
through the law but through the gospel.
• “For the sake of remembrance and better un-
derstading” (p. 99), it can be beneficial to make
use of images, especially images of Christ.
Thus by all accounts the Lutheran Reformation
has played a decisive role in creating a relaxed atti-
tude toward religious images, and thence to a sec-
ular view of human art products. At the same time
God, according to Luther, is alive and present in
the world of the senses: “Our home, farm, field
and garden and everything are full of the Bible, by
which God through his wonderful deeds not only
preaches to us but also taps on our eyes, touches
our senses, and in secret illuminates our hearts”
(Sermon of 25th May 1544).17
The Twofold Inheritance of Luther’s
Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms
The Lutheran Reformation was born as an inter-
nal church reform movement with a clear theo-
logical profile. But how would this religious vision
translate into an idea of social community? Histor-
ically we know that in the beginning Luther and
his associates had no vision for society. But on
December 10th 1520, when he burned the canon
law together with the papal bull of excommuni-
cation, he was not only calling into question the
pope’s religious authority, he was also performing a
political act—in the middle of the public sphere.
Religion became politics.
The task ahead was to find out what type of
society should be built up, now that canon law
had ceased to rule. Luther’s response was his fa-
mous doctrine of the two kingdoms, as revealed in
particular in the work, Temporal Authority: To What
Extent it Should be Obeyed , from 1523.18 It is this
doctrine of Luther’s that has further contributed to
the self-secularisation of Christianity, without ever
leading to a total separation of religion and politics,
however.
The Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of the Devil
In this work on secular authority, Luther builds on
the view of Augustine that the kingdom of God
in this world is confronting the kingdom of the
devil in single combat. Correspondingly, Luther di-
vides people into two groups: “the first belonging
to the kingdom of God, the second belonging to
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the kingdom of the world” (p. 88). Luther was def-
initely not an optimist on behalf of humanity or
Christianity. Even though he lived in a society in
which everybody (with the exception of a few Jews)
was baptised and raised in the Christian faith, he
was convinced that very few were actually Chris-
tians: “the world and the masses are and always will
be un-Christian, even if they are all baptized and
Christian in name. Christians are few and far be-
tween (as the saying is)” (p. 91). Society therefore
cannot be built on the goodness of humankind,
which is a rare phenomenon, but solely on public
order, which keeps wickedness down. It is there-
fore an important point in the doctrine of the two
kingdoms that, in the final count, it is God who
rules the world, both “by the word” (by persuasion)
and “by the sword” (by force). The devil himself
is merely a creature, not a divine power alongside
God.
The Purpose of the State’s Power
When the gospel is publicly preached, faith is of-
fered to all citizens of society, but it is always vol-
untary. This is crucial to Luther, and it explains
why he opposed church discipline. “No one shall
or can command the soul, unless he is able to show
it the way to heaven; but this no man [sic] can do,
only God alone” (p. 106). Luther therefore strongly
resists the attempt by the state to force anyone into
faith by legislation or some other way: “Therefore,
where the temporal authority presumes to prescribe
laws for the soul, it encroaches upon God’s govern-
ment and only misleads souls and destroys them”
(p. 105). This awareness of the limits of the state
paved the way for subsequent constitutional notions
of freedom of religion.
But the crucial point is that God also protects
public order through the legal system and polit-
ical power. The authorities must of necessity act
with force. Because the world is with the wicked—
“among thousands there is scarcely a single true
Christian”—we have the sword of the authorities
so that the wicked “are obliged to keep still and
to maintain an outward peace” (p. 91). Here we
find the view of political power as the source of
a society governed by law, but also a power that
ultimately has the means to uphold law and or-
der through the penal system if the law is violated.
This power does not exist for the sake of the au-
thorities, but for the weak in society who would
otherwise be overwhelmed by the wicked.
The Christian and the Political Realm
The question for Luther was then whether evangel-
ical Christians could participate in the authorities’
exercise of power without damaging their souls. His
answer was a resounding ‘yes.’ Not only is it pos-
sible for a Christian to participate, indeed it is a
duty to be a judge, a soldier, a hangman. For the
authorities are installed by God for the benefit of
the weak in society. Here, then, is the structure of
Luther’s doctrine of the two kingdoms:
• There is only one God, who rules the world
(the monotheist premise)
• God rules the world with his right hand and
his left hand
• With God’s right hand God rules the life of
the church through the preaching of the gospel,
which can only be received voluntarily, without
church discipline or force from the authorities
• With God’s left hand God rules society as a
whole through authorities, which must exert
force to bring the wicked to keep the law (pre-
ventative) and to uphold the rule of law for the
benefit of the weak (protective).
From this summary one could regard
Lutheranism as a forerunner of the liberalist state,
which combines the powers of the state with a
sense of what lies outside its domain: the citizens’
faith and doubt, their hope and desperation, their
love and lack of love. And it is true that Luther
abolished the earlier medieval view that the worldly
authorities are subordinated to the order of the
church.
The Interdependence of the Two Kingdoms
However, on closer scrutiny we discover that the
political programme that Luther and his associates
worked out in the course of the 1520s also included
powerful interplay between the spiritual and the
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secular regiments. It was a ruler’s duty, for instance,
to ensure that the gospel was indeed preached in
freedom to the citizens, so that there would be the
possibility that faith could grow among them. As a
modern counterpart, we might note that both pas-
tors and imams are attached to the Danish prison
service, and the desire for spiritual care for the in-
mates will hardly decrease over the coming years.
In the second place, Lutheranism also had
a complete cultural programme for reorganising
society. This was because society was not seen as a
godless territory but as an area within which God’s
‘natural law’ ruled. Whereas marriage in a Catholic
context was regarded as a church sacrament, in the
Protestant church it was now seen as a civic ar-
rangement pleasing to God; marriage is not about
eternal bliss but about happiness and well-being.
Whereas education belonged previously under the
Church, there were now serious moves towards a
public education system, since education was good
for both society and for the individual. For exam-
ple, the Reformation of the Danish church in 1536
was decisive for the renovation in 1537 of the Uni-
versity of Copenhagen, which had fallen into dis-
repair. Also the legal system was similarly reformed,
with the courts being moved from Church to state
jurisdiction, whereas large areas of canon law con-
tinued as they were. The idea was that equality
should prevail while people remained free to follow
particular traditions.19 It was similar in the case of
the citizens’ health and of relief for the poor.
In organisational terms all this must be seen
as a move towards secularisation; but as regards
content everything points to religious themes ac-
quiring a more prominent place than before. We
only need to look at the list of contents in the
Danish Church Ordinance of 1537/39 to observe
how the visiting of the sick and the poor, in-
struction of midwives and women in confinement,
school attendance, poor relief and and hospitals are
far more conspicuous in the Church’s—and thus
society’s—understanding of its tasks.20 In brief:
along with the division of the spiritual and the tempo-
ral regiments came an increasingly reciprocal permeation
of the religious and political sphere. The civic regula-
tions were introduced not just preventatively and
protectively to safeguard society from evil, but also
positively and procreatively to take care of the welfare
of its citizens in a broader sense. As we read in the
Confessio Augustana article 21, the regulations of
society and the family, are to be upheld as “God’s
good regulations . . . so that love can be exercised in
them.”21 Hence, Christian love is the measure for
what is right and proper, including in the secular
realm.
Modern Consequences
Accordingly, the political programme of
Lutheranism not only led to a secular state
governed by law and order but also to the forma-
tion of the modern welfare state, in which citizens
dare to trust that the state wishes them well; while
the state knows that politically it cannot make its
citizens either happy or blessed. In this connection
we must ask why precisely Denmark became
the first country to introduce compulsory school
attendance (in 1814), and the second country,
after Germany, to introduce the old age pension
(1891), for both men and women. The political
scientist Tim Knudsen and the historian Uffe
Østergaard have attempted to trace the roots of the
comprehensive welfare state back to the Lutheran
understanding that grace (in the spiritual kingdom)
is given free of charge. In similar fashion, the
Scandinavian countries have created the so-called
‘universal welfare state’ (within the temporal
kingdom), where services are given to all citizens
for free, whether or not they deserve them, and
irrespective of any private pensions.22 This idea of
the universal welfare state is not itself universal;
its emergence depends on specific religio-cultural
conditions.
The Lutheran doctrine of the two kingdoms
thus has had a twofold historical effect. On the
one hand it has laid the foundation for a liberalist
separation of religion and politics, each of which
has its sphere of influence. On the other hand the
spiritual kingdom has provided inspiration for civic
regulations, resulting in a conservative, later on a
social-democratic, welfare state. The distinction is
made between religion and politics, but the two
domains have never been separated; nor was such
separation ever intended.
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The Politics of Separation versus
the Politics of Recognition
In contrast to Luther’s time we no longer live in a
guardian state, where care of the citizens’ well-being
is controlled by an autocratic political system. Most
of us in the West now live in a centreless society
without a ruling midpoint, where political values
are constantly negotiable, and the sources for po-
litical preferences come from many places. We also
live with a global consciousness, in which Chris-
tianity’s cultural resources are no longer assumed,
and ideas and influences flow across national bor-
ders and cultures. The question for us is what does
this mean for religious politics today? I see two
basic possibilities.
We can either work towards a secularist solution,
according to which the political sphere requires a
limitation of the religious life in principle to the
private sphere—leaving the public sphere as free
of religion as humanly possible. Or we can work
towards a politics of recognition, which acknowledges
the actual existence of religious practices and ideas
in the public sphere, and therefore recognises that
the borders between the political system and the
religious life are constantly negotiable, depending
on the character of the religious cultures in any
given society at any given time.
A Secularist Solution
The former is the French model for a joint-state
secularism (laı¨cite´), which forbids religious symbols
(from cross to veil) in the public sphere, includ-
ing the teaching of religious studies in the public
schools. This model is echoed in the First Amend-
ment to the US Constitution. The politics of recogni-
tion model has been the common European model,
in which society makes legal compacts with specific
faith communities (e.g. in Italy, Spain or Austria)
or undertakes other legal regulations of its relation-
ship to religious groups as recognised and approved
faith communities.23
A Politics of Recognition
Denmark is an example of the second model.
When Article 4 of the Danish Constitution was
passed in 1849, it said: “The Evangelical Lutheran
Church shall be the Established Church of
Denmark, and, as such, it shall be supported by the
State.” The thinking was that the new democracy
should recognise the prior existence of a huge ma-
jority church, and thus the Constitution promised a
church order in Article 66: “The constitution of the
Established Church shall be laid down by Statute.”
This so-called ‘promissory clause’ has never been
made good. Similarly, the Constitution promises
in Article 69: “Rules for religious bodies dissent-
ing from the Established Church shall be laid
down by Statute;” but neither has this clause been
made good in the form of an overall law for re-
ligious communities. Over time 104 such commu-
nities of widely varying type and size have been
‘recognised’ and ‘approved.’ Despite all differences
and obscurities the State of Denmark has thus
recognised certain religious cultures as reciprocal
collaborators.24
In this respect the Constitution contains specific
clauses relating to freedom of religion and freedom
of speech:
Article 67: “The citizens shall be entitled to
form congregations for the worship of God
in a manner consistent with their convic-
tions, provided that nothing at variance with
good morals or public order shall be taught
or done.”
Article 77: “Any person shall be entitled to
publish his thoughts in printing, in writ-
ing, and in speech, provided that he may be
held answerable in a court of justice. Cen-
sorship and other preventive measures shall
never again be introduced.”
These are clear principles that establish indi-
vidual religious choice. No one can censor either
religions themselves, or statements for or against
religions. But my collegue, Henning Koch, profes-
sor of law, has pointed out that the use of these
two freedoms comes with a legal responsibility for
maintaining public law and order.
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The Role of the Legal System
in the Cartoon Crisis
When we look back at the effect of the Muhammad
cartoons on Denmark’s reputation, we can wonder
at the absence of the legal system in the debate. For
the Danish Penal Code Section 140 states: “Those
who publicly mock or insult the doctrines or wor-
ship of any religious community that is legal in
this country, shall be punished by a fine or impris-
onment for up to four months.”
This so-called ‘blasphemy law’ protects neither
God nor Jesus nor prophets from insults, but it
protects religious groups in general.25 In a simi-
lar fashion Section 266b penalises statements that
“. . . threaten, insult or degrade a group of persons
on account of their race, colour, national or ethnic
origin, belief or sexual orientation,” with up to 2
years’ imprisonment. Individuals are also protected
against violation of honour (Section 267), against
spying and photographing in a “not freely accessi-
ble place” (Section 264a), against threats on their
“life, health or well-being” (Section 266), or appeals
to “acts of violence and vandalism” (Section 266a),
and so on.26
How then to balance the right to practise re-
ligion without public mockery with the right to
freedom of speech? It is clear that legally neither
freedom of religion nor freedom of speech are un-
limited. But freedom of speech ensures that re-
ligions can be criticised both for their claims to
truth and for their socio-ethical consequences. Crit-
icism of religions is allowed (and in my opinion is
even beneficial), just as criticism is allowed of the
ethics of a religion for being paternalistic, oppres-
sive to women and so on. But such criticism is
not allowed that summarily insults the creed of a
religious group in order to deride it.
Applicability of the Blasphemy Law
The question now is whether the blasphemy law
reasonably can be applied against Jyllands-Posten.
The problem, from a legal point of view, can-
not be the drawings of Muhammad in them-
selves, but rather the text that accompanied the
cartoons. As mentioned above, the paper’s cul-
tural editor wrote that Muslims must also learn
that in a secular democracy with freedom of
speech one must be ready to a live with “scorn,
mockery and ridicule.” It is in this spirit that
the Muhammad-cartoons were published the fol-
lowing day. During the heated discussions in
Denmark in February 2006, in the company of
several law professors, I therefore publicly sup-
ported the request of Muslim groups that a Danish
court should test the claim that the Muhammad
cartoons were published precisely in order to insult
and ridicule Muslims in Denmark (and elsewhere).
This request was then considered by the public
prosecutor.
On March 15, 2006, he finally rejected the case,
based on (probably legally reasonable) obstacles for
winning this particular case. He did so on several
grounds, of which the following were the more im-
portant: the prohibition against images of Muham-
mad is in fact not universal within Islam; a number
of the cartoons must be designated as neutral; and
even the cartoon which shows a bomb in Muham-
mad’s turban can be interpreted in several ways, in-
cluding as a socio-ethical criticism of the use that
is made of Muhammad within areas of radicalised
Islam. At the same time, however, the public pros-
ecutor upheld in his conclusion that Sections 140
and 266b of the Penal Code do eventually set limits
to freedom of speech as regards religious and ethical
subjects.
The public prosecutor’s additional argument for
not proceeding with the case was that the prece-
dents are few and far between; the last convic-
tion in Denmark for blasphemy was as far back as
1938. Other reasons for not bringing charges were
also provided. Henning Koch has pointed out that
since the prohibition against depicting Muhammad
does not exist in the Qur’an but only in the Ha-
diths, it hardly can be regarded as an insult of cen-
tral ‘doctrines.’ Against this, one could argue that
the case is not just about what the Qur’an says
(which would correspond to a Protestant scripture
principle), but rather about what is important for
Islam as it is lived in Denmark. Section 140 deals
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precisely with protecting “the doctrines or wor-
ship of any religious community that is legal in
this country.” Add to this the fact that the pic-
tures were not neutral depictions of Muhammad
but caricatures that identified the prophet with Is-
lamic terrorism and were thus calculated to mock
and deride certain groups of believers among the
Danish people, I still cannot understand why such
a case has not been brought.
A Political Policy of Religious
Blindness
The argument for doing exactly that is that a
case would be held within the framework of of-
ficial Denmark. And such an answer from offi-
cial Denmark was not heard until the statement
of the Conservative Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Per Stig Møller. Prime Minister Anders Fogh Ras-
mussen rightly pointed out that according to the
Constitution he cannot as Prime Minister censor
the press, and that therefore he cannot apologise
for editorial choices for which he has no responsi-
bility. On the other hand as a statesman he could
have deplored the publication on behalf of official
Denmark, and not just as a private person. He
could have listened to the many experienced diplo-
mats at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who are
used to moving in cultures other than the Euro-
American one. He could have expressed a willing-
ness to protect a minority from political rhetoric
aimed at immigrants, one that has been allowed
to grow even among parliamentary politicians in a
party supporting the present government. In other
words, the Prime Minister could have responded
within the framework of the politics of recognition
instead of pursuing a policy that pretends that re-
ligious minorities are of no concern of the state. It
is this policy of blindness to religion that has been
perceived as arrogant and disrespectful of other na-
tions, obviously against the Prime Minister’s own
intentions.
In the same way we can ask whether the misin-
formation that a delegation from the Islamic Faith
Community in Copenhagen has spread in Mus-
lim circles in Egypt and elsewhere is not cov-
ered by the Section 129b of the Penal Code,
which states: “Whoever damages the interests of
the country by consciously and untruthfully pub-
licly ascribing to the government or any other
public authority an act which it has not under-
taken shall be liable to a fine or imprisonment
up to 2 years.” It is perfectly possible that this
law, which deals solely with misinformation regard-
ing the government and public authorities, can-
not be applied to the misinformation on behalf
of a newspaper, Jyllands-Posten. But if that is the
case, we might ask whether Parliament should not
legislate against such actions that threaten public
law and order. Admittedly it would only be ‘sym-
bolic legislation,’ but even that can be beneficial if
the overall aim of the law is to maintain law and
order.
Protecting the Public Debate
The effects of the Mohammed-cartoons can only
be described as quite all out of proportion, and
many parties contributed to the escalation of the
conflict. What can be learned from it all is that
everything that belongs within the life of soci-
ety, including religions and cultures, must be part
of the political dialogue. But dialogue in itself
is not enough; the legal system is also required
to set limits on hate speech from whatever side.
There is no need of a law for the benefit of
Muslims—or against them for that matter. What
is needed are laws that demonstrate the poli-
tics of recognition in relation to all the practis-
ing religions in Denmark, a politics of recogni-
tion that, of course, at the same time must make
demands on those groups who ask for society’s
respect.
Legally we need not a lex islamica, but a law
on right and reason. Morally we do not call for
agreement on our various views of life or our
preferences, but merely for a proper tone in which
to conduct the public debate.
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